Enough of AACS
Not too long ago, I wrote a post that talked about AACS and how it fits in the larger system of copy protection and DRM that tries its best to maintain iron-fisted control of content from its source all the way to your eye. In that post, I made mention of an emerging series of articles by the guys at Freedom to Tinker regarding some of the technical aspects of the AACS spec, and attacks against it. Since then, the series has completed, and they've moved on to other things (such as how the DRM obsession of content providers has led them to back themselves into a corner).
For those of you who are still interested in how this technology is fundamentally crackable, and other meta-issues surrounding the ongoing DRM mess (did you know that Blu-ray has been cracked now too?), here's a list of the articles in Freedom to Tinker's AACS series.
- AACS Decryption Code Released
- Extracting and Using Keys
- Blacklisting, Oracles, and Traitor Tracing
- Game Theory of Blacklisting
- Title Keys Start Leaking
- Sequence Keys and Tracing
- Modeling the Battle
Now as far as AACS, and DRM in general are concerned, I feel like this issue has been slightly beaten to death of late. It's probably a good idea to step back now, take a deep breath, and do our best to digest what's been discussed. And with Vista finally in the wild, we can start to objectively investigate technology that's been more conjecture, theory, and specification documentation before now. Let's re-arm, refuel, and find new arguments or evidence to bring to the table to build on what's already there. Of if you're truly sick and tired of the debate, how about worrying about something else out there in the great wide world of security...like electronic voting.
At the very least, consider subscribing to Freedom to Tinker. It's a worthy feed.